Introduction
Since the 1970s the Australian aid program has had poverty reduction as its primary stated aim. This is no different in the 2006 White Paper on Australian aid, which centres the aid policy framework on 'the objective of Australia's aid program: to assist developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development, in line with Australia's national interest ' (AusAID 2006: x) .
This formulation, while changing emphasis on how it has been phrased, has been remarkably consistent ever since the Jackson Committee report of 1984 (see Kilby 1996) . At that time, the focus was on the so-called 'triple mandate' of Australian aid being concerned with poverty reduction, the national interest, and trade promotion (Jackson 1984) . Likewise, in response to the Simons Report on the Australian aid program of 1997 (Simons 1997) , the government prioritised poverty reduction and the national interest, with trade being subsumed under the rubric of national interest through direct trade enhancement (AusAID 1997) . This has continued as the promotion of trade 'as a path to growth' in the 2006 White Paper (AusAID 2006: xii) , but now aid is generally not used to directly subsidise Australia's trade with developing countries.
Despite the long history of an aid program ostensibly focusing on poverty alleviation, there is little analysis in the 2006 White Paper of how such an attack on poverty might occur in any detail. The emphasis is on the promotion of economic growth as the main driver, emerging from the neoliberal discourse that high growth rates lead to poverty reduction. But this level of abstraction provides little detail about how this might occur, and does not examine the debates. As the next section will show, a focus on economic growth alone as the path for poverty reduction is somewhat contested (Jha 2000; Ravallion 1997; Ravallion and Chen 2003) . This article argues that dependence on growth alone is not enough to alleviate chronic poverty and argues for a more nuanced approach that deals directly with the issues of marginalised groups, growing inequality, and the ruralÁ/ urban divide.
The White Paper and the associated 'Core group recommendations report' (AusAID 2005) will be examined in how they see poverty reduction being addressed in the aid program, and I will make some analysis of how this aligns with contemporary development thinking. In particular I will look at the focus on economic growth, and dilemmas that emerge when it is seen as being instrumental for long term poverty reduction. It will examine growing inequality, the ruralÁ/ urban divide, and people's capabilities and exclusion, all of which are areas of contestation in the economic growth/poverty discourse. Finally, the alternative policies by the British aid agency, the Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank will be looked at, and I will conclude with some suggestions on how the practice of the Australian aid program can better match the goal of poverty reduction.
Poverty alleviation in the White Paper
Beyond a commitment to poverty alleviation and a general statement of support for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the White Paper has remarkably little to say on how the Australian Agency for International Development's (AusAID) program might contribute to the achievement of these goals. The White Paper strategy is based on four key themes: accelerating economic growth, fostering effective states, investing in people, and promoting regional stability*/ all within a context of promoting greater gender equity (AusAID 2006: iii) . In practice, the focus on economic growth involves removing what are seen to be barriers: land tenure arrangements in the Pacific, infrastructure more generally, and lack of a skilled workforce in the Pacific. In the area of governance the focus will be on leadership, the promotion of reform and anti-corruption measures, and an integrated approach to law and order. Stronger investment in people involves promoting better health (particularly in The Australian aid program: dealing with poverty? 115 addressing the HIV pandemic) and education, including a doubling of scholarships to Australian higher education institutions (AusAID 2006: xiii) .
While these initiatives in and of themselves are useful and can contribute to long-term poverty reduction, the question remains whether this will occur. What is missing in the White Paper and the associated core group recommendations is a broad analysis of the drivers of poverty in the region and the associated changes in poverty profiles in the key countries that the aid program should focus on. Some of these drivers of poverty are tantalisingly touched upon but not elaborated in the core group report: 'Inequalities are also emerging within national borders'; '. . . fast economic growth has brought significant development and social challenges'; and '. . . [there are] sharp rises in rural and urban inequality ' (AusAID 2005: 6-4, 6-10, 6-12) . In the end, however, the White Paper settles for '. . . policies and programs to generate increases in aggregate growth and, in special circumstances, target groups and regions that, for whatever reason, are not benefiting from broader growth gains' (AusAID 2006: 35, emphasis added) . A targeted focus should be core to the program rather than reserved for 'special circumstances'. The next section will look at the changing nature of poverty*/ ruralÁ/ urban disparities, rising inequality, and increased vulnerability*/ and examine how they are addressed in the White Paper.
The nature of poverty
While there has been a marked fall in the level of poverty in some countries over the past few years as a result of relatively strong economic growth, it has been uneven across many countries. This raises the question of whether high growth rates alone are the expected panacea for poverty relief. For example, poverty levels in India have been falling at around 1 per cent per annum since the early 1970s, in times of both low and high growth rates, and closed and open economic policies (Ravallion 2002) . This points to factors other than high growth rates in helping poverty reduction. Going a step further, Joseph Stiglitz (2002) and Fred Argy (1998 Argy ( , 2003 argue that the effects of growth without countervailing distributive policies can be counterproductive, and may in fact lead to worse poverty outcomes for some communities. This view is supported by the evidence that the total number of people living in poverty had increased in the decade to 1998; and that if China, and to a lesser extent India, are taken out of the equation, then the percentage fall in global poverty is small, leading to the phenomenon of jobless growth as an emerging challenge (Chen and Ravallion 2001) . Four factors affect the seemingly intractable issue of severe poverty: its dynamic nature, the widening ruralÁ/ urban divide, rising levels of inequality, and increased vulnerability.
The dynamic nature of poverty
Poverty and the levels of poverty are not static, and there is not a constant linear fall (or rise). Rather, poverty is dynamic, and people are moving in and out of poverty at the same time. Panel data such as national accounts and national surveys, however, tell us very little about who is falling in and out of poverty (and why) at any point in time: such broad statistics tend to focus on aggregate trends only, and so can be misleading in that they ignore both regional disparities and temporal changes. For example, in a study of 36 villages in Andhra Pradesh, India, Anirudh Krishna (2006) found that while the level of poverty fell 2 per cent over a 25-year period, it was not the steady (if not glacial) fall the data suggested. In that 25-year period, 14 per cent of households came out of poverty and 12 per cent of households fell into poverty; in all 26 per cent of household experienced changes in their poverty levels. Bob Baulch and Neil McCulloch (2002) came up with similar findings in Pakistan, but with even higher numbers of the community going into and out of poverty over time ; and McCulloch and Michele Calandrino (2003) had a similar story in Sichuan province, China. These experiences suggest that any generalised statement about slow growth and the like tells us very little of what happened and why. Given this dynamic, the only sensible policy response is to target interventions that increase the number of people exiting from poverty and decrease the numbers going into poverty*/ that is, deal with vulnerability.
In the Andhra Pradesh case, while the state government had policies for pulling people out of poverty, they did not have the right policies to prevent people from falling into poverty: high rates of agricultural growth led to more work for the poor and people came out of poverty, but it was in fact access to health services and consumer credit that were required to prevent people from falling into poverty (Krishna 2006: 284) . By way of contrast, in China, access to land and education were effective in pulling people out of poverty, while in Pakistan, education had little effect (Baulch and McCulloch 2002) . There is no simple blueprint available to overcome chronic poverty; rather, any responses must be nuanced to meet local needs (McKay and Lawson 2003; Baulch and McCulloch 2002; McCulloch and Calandrino 2003) ; and a 'one size fits all' response characterised by some of the White Paper recommendations may not work. This important role of country analyses that these findings suggest will be returned to later.
RuralÁ/ urban disparities
Urbanisation as a consequence of growth is often seen as a natural way of freeing people from grinding rural poverty. However, this rush to the cities is often exacerbated by government policy and investment priorities that lead to slow growth in agriculture and other industries in rural areas, which in turn lead to an increase in poverty when there is little or no opportunity to move. In
The Australian aid program: dealing with poverty? 117 China, for example, 70 per cent of rural households are expected to have a fall in real income in the period 2001Á/ 07, while less than 10 per cent of urban households will be adversely affected (Ravallion 2006) . In China, the urbanÁ/ rural income gap is at a 3-to-1 ratio, while in India it is much lower at 1.5-to-1 (Fan et al. 2005) . These figures would seem to reflect China's stronger push for urbanisation, while in India there is greater policy investment by government in rural areas because of the huge rural (voting) constituency.
The effect of rural investment on poverty levels is quite marked: to take two relatively simple examples, the multiplier effect on rural incomes from investment in rural roads was as great as 9:1 in the 1960s and today is still as high as 3:1 (DFID 2005a: 22); and a 1 per cent increase in agricultural yields reduces poverty levels by 1 per cent due to the related rise in rural wages (Uphoff 2003) . The converse also applies if there is disinvestment in rural areas: Petia Topalova found that in India those rural districts whose industries were exposed to trade liberalisation without any compensatory measures, had an increase in both the level of poverty and the poverty gap index (PGI) 1 of 2 per cent and 0.6 per cent respectively (Topalova 2005). The AusAID White Paper has little to say about rural development (given that this is where the poor are) beyond a note on the role of the private sector in rural development (AusAID 2006: xii) . Given that in most developing countries the poor in rural areas are living in peasant or semi-subsistence economies it is hard to see how a 'private sector approach' will have the desired affect of addressing rural poverty. An alternative approach might be to use different livelihood strategies, that deal with each group in rural areas with a specific targeted approach, inter alia labour, land owners, farmers and pastoralists (La Rovere et al. 2006) .
Inequality
The extent of poverty is not the only key measure to be concerned with in poverty analysis; the depth of poverty and related inequality also play a key role. The Poverty Gap Index measures depth of poverty, and the Gini coefficient measures inequality (Sen 1976) .
2 The PGI is, for example, highest in India and China, both of which have shown very little change in this index despite increasing growth figures (Chen and Ravallion 2001) . Similarly, the Gini also increased. For example, in rural China between 1981 and 1995, the Gini increased from 0.239 to 0.340 (Renwei and Shi 1997) . 'Some inequalities may matter more than others in how the poor share growth' (Ravallion and Datt 1999: 6) . The level of ruralÁ/ urban inequality may be a case in point, in that dual economies in the form of separate urban and rural economies tend to emerge, so that growth in an urban economy does not benefit the rural poor due to mobility restrictions across these economies (Topalova 2005) . Similarly, the life of the poor in urban China has been characterised by increasing inequality and uncertainty, and higher costs faced by households tends to offset any income effect (Ravallion and Datt 1999) . This phenomenon of widening inequality can also be found in Pacific countries as well as the larger Asian states: of the countries receiving priority in the White Paper, Papua New Guinea is worst ranked with a Gini coefficient of 50.6.
The White Paper uses David Dollar and Aart Kraay's (2004) arguments that the role of growth in inequality is inconclusive. However, their case is vigorously contested (Basu 2006; Ravallion 2006; Topalova 2005; Ninan 2000) . Robert Wade (2001) found that of eight different measures of inequality, seven showed rising inequality poverty over the past 20 years, and the Gini coefficient, which shows the inconclusive result, gives an excessive weight to changes around the middle of the distribution and insufficient weight to changes at the extremes, in effect understating the level of inequality.
The variation in equality across countries is illustrative. For example, China showed rising inequality, while in India the level of inequality grew slowly (Deaton and Drèze 2002) . A possible explanation for India's slower growth in inequality might lie in the fact that high levels of transfers to rural areas inherent in Indian government policy has led to a higher level of rural growth and reduced ruralÁ/ urban inequality relative to China (Uphoff 2003; Jha 2000) . This suggests that Dollar and Kray have not factored in these transfers in their explanation. A similar pattern of a rising ruralÁ/ urban divide in terms of inequality can be found across the developing world, and so it could be argued that state investment in rural infrastructure in order to achieve higher agricultural returns is one way of dealing with inequality that may be worth considering (Ravallion and Datt 1999; Mehta and Shah 2003) .
The quality of the economic growth and the notion of pro-poor growth are important factors in dealing with rising inequality. For example, in China, while the overall growth rate for the decade 1990Á/ 99 was 6.2 per cent, for the poorest households it was only 3 per cent, and for the poor overall growth was only a little better at 4 per cent (Ravallion and Chen 2003) . These results would indicate that if poverty alleviation is to be an objective of growth, then a much sharper focus of that growth should be at specific sectors and communities. Likewise the initial level of poverty and literacy levels at the beginning of a growth period also play a role in both the level of poverty and inequality that results from that growth. Nancy Birdsall and Juan Luis Londono (1997: 36) argue that 'the long standing inattention in the distribution of assets [the poor's access to them], especially education, has been costly'. The example of the Middle East and North Africa is a case in point where, because of high levels of distribution and equality, there has been low poverty and low inequality in a low-growth environment (Adams and Page 2003) .
While there might be some debate about whether inequality is increasing or decreasing in certain countries, what is generally agreed is that high levels of inequality are a brake on poverty reduction in periods of economic growth (Ravallion 1997) . The fact that it is not directly addressed in the White Paper may be because AusAID sees the issue of inequality as less relevant than dealing
The Australian aid program: dealing with poverty? 119 with absolute poverty in development policy. Interestingly, none of AusAID's country analyses deal with the issue of inequality either (AusAID 2005). The problem, however, is that when international security is a growing concern and is a factor in Australia's national interest, then the link between growing inequality, and rising insecurity and global violence is important at a policy level, and is relevant to the White Paper discussion (Wade 2001; Li and Schwaub 2004) .
Vulnerability and capability
Vulnerability is also seen as a key indicator of relative poverty along with human capital, housing and assets (Jha 2006; Zeller et al. 2006; Mehta and Shah 2003) . It is important given the dynamic nature of large numbers of people on the margin who are moving in and out of poverty over time. While consumption has been the measure of poverty, this is an annualised aggregate which tells us little about living standards, consumption and seasonal shocks. For example, the welfare of India's rural poor has been rising much more slowly than would be indicated by average consumption and GDP growth, and can be explained by the inability of the rural poor to smooth the levels of consumption of food and other necessities over time (Jha 2006) . They are more vulnerable in that they have '. . . to live more in the present and discount the future' (Wood 2003: 468) , leaving them more susceptible to adverse events. In the case of China, the rural poor experienced an initial fall in poverty in 1980, followed by an upturn with a relative increase in poverty according to World Bank measures, as well as a marked increase in the Gini index (Yao 2000; Ravallion 2006) . From this evidence, and the cases of China, Pakistan and India, we can see that vulnerability is rising, particularly in rural areas (Yao 2000; Baulch and McCulloch 2002; McCulloch and Calandrino 2003) .
The other side of the vulnerability coin is capabilities (Sen 1999) ; that is, the requirements for people to function and expand '. . . the range of things that a person can be and do, such as to be healthy and well-nourished, to be knowledgeable, and to participate in community life' (Fukuda-Parr 2003: 303) . Part of this is about '. . . claims about fundamental entitlements that are to some extent independent of the preferences that people happen to have, preferences shaped, often, by unjust background conditions' (Nussbaum 2003: 34) . These principles are the basis of the Human Development Index (HDI) which has been developed and expanded through the 1990s. The HDI is an attempt to address the fundamental criticism of the neoliberal approach to defining well-being as utility maximising, and the inherent neglect of rights freedoms, and agency that are also necessary to achieve what Norman Uphoff (2003) calls 'life chances' implicit in this approach (Nussbaum 2003) . A capabilities approach recognises economic growth is important, but as a means rather than an end, with equity becoming the major policy objective, and measures of deprivation and distribution being central. Approaches that focus on the material tend to leave out a whole set of the poor who are destitute: for these people '. . . [most] antipoverty policy is irrelevant . . . and the financial resources directed to challenging destitution are entirely inadequate . . . leaving most destitute people reliant on their own heavily constrained forms of agency' (Harriss-White 2005: 888).
The question then is what sort of policy approach in official aid programs can address these key issues of intractable poverty? The next section will look at two approaches to poverty strategies: that of DFID, and the World Bank's poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs).
DFID poverty policy
DFID released its White Paper on aid in 2000 and, like its Australian counterpart, it also has a direct focus on poverty with the ambitious title of 'Eliminating world poverty: Making globalisation work for the poor' (DFID 2000) . Following the release of the DFID White Paper, a number of important policy documents have been developed which specifically focus on various dimensions of poverty and how they may be combated. The policies tend to eschew sweeping statements about economic growth, but look at strategies that deal with inter alia social exclusion, urban poverty and the role of agriculture which is seen as the 'heart of poverty reduction' and key to the overall strategy (DFID 2005b: 1). Social protection is specifically identified with DFID (2005b) arguing that many poverty reduction strategies fail to reach those especially excluded groups (women, children, minority groups, indigenous peoples and so on) (Mehta and Shah 2003: 507) unless there are policies specifically designed to do so.
The reason DFID policy focuses on these key areas is because the issues they deal with were found to be the real blockages to sustained poverty reduction. For example, DFID takes the view that social exclusion is a key cause of poverty and therefore should be directly attacked by promoting regulatory and policy frameworks, putting in place affirmative action programs to ensure equal access to public expenditure, improving economic opportunities, and promoting political participation. This is quite a radical approach that is built upon a poverty analysis which identifies and attempts to measure the areas of social exclusion to be addressed, develops programs and then evaluates the effectiveness of the policy within a three-year timeframe (DFID 2005b: 5, 8, 21) .
As an example, in Bangladesh the British government has supported a 'Cash for Education' program that reaches 2.4 million children, which has increased primary school enrolment by up to one-third, and children stay at school for up to two more years. More education means increased future earnings for these young people, by up to one-quarter. In Ethiopia, five million people have been taken out of emergency relief and now receive predictable transfers through a The Australian aid program: dealing with poverty? 121 national safety net (Benn 2005) . This move to direct payments for certain services is one way that DFID sees the poor being directly reached. While there may be scepticism about direct payments in that they may encourage a 'welfare mentality', the reason these programs are supported is that:
They ensure a healthy and well-educated workforce, including amongst poor people. Such transfers give people a cushion in times of trouble, preventing the need for emergency sales, where often they are forced to sell their assets*/ such as chickens, their recent harvest or a bicycle*/ thereby driving people into deeper poverty. And some costly emergency interventions would not be required if chronically poor people were provided long-term protection. Even during hard times, people can and want to be productive (Benn 2005 ).
DFID's approach to poverty reduction involves a range of targeted programs with strategies that are appropriate to local contexts and which directly reach those marginalised groups and areas where chronic and intractable poverty is found. By way of contrast, a quite different approach emerging within the World Bank is based on the PRSPs, to which I now turn.
Poverty reduction strategy papers
To the extent that it is explicit in its approach to poverty reduction, the AusAID White Paper seems to be based on some of the principles of the PRSP process of the World Bank in that its framework lies in a neoliberal model of development. The PRSP process began in 1999 as a response to growing criticism of the effects of structural adjustment conditionality that were being imposed as part of World Bank development loans and International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural loans throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Zuckerman 2002a) . The IMF replaced structural adjustment with poverty reduction growth facility, and the World Bank replaced their policy framework papers with PRSPs as preconditions for loan and debt relief. The important features of the PRSP process is that it had to be prepared by the recipient country (not the Bank); there had to be a broader base of consultation within the country including with community groups, civil society groups, business groups, and government; and the implications for poverty reduction must be shown in all aspects of government programs (Devarajan and Go 2002) .
This broader approach, however, does not mean that there has been a seachange in outcomes; the PRSP process seems to be little more than the same as before but under a different guise (Shah 2005; Grindle 2004; Craig and Porter 2003; Petras and Veltmeyer 2002) . This continuing neoliberal approach sees the poor as '. . . those who are not effectively integrated into the market economy' (Hulme and Shepherd 2003: 404) In this model, deep poverty and its related inequalities are poorly addressed, if at all, with PRSPs being silent on issues of unequal market power, the consolidation of corporate power, and restrictions on migration (Craig and Porter 2003) . The underlying focus seems to be that the market can 'liberate' the not-so-poor, but at the expense of the chronically poor who in fact may become worse off (Hulme and Shepherd 2003: 404) . In short, the PRSP model is a technical approach to what is essentially the political problem of how power is exercised in communities. Examples of this include decentralisation programs (a favourite in PRSPs), which are essentially a technical approach to governance and poverty alleviation that has the effect of 'decentralis[ing] tyranny' (Craig and Porter 2003: 66) .
PRSPs and gender
While many PRSPs analyses touch on poor households and the like, they seldom disaggregate the data along gender lines into women and men, girls and boys, and certainly not into ethnic groups (Zuckerman 2002b) . There is an inherent assumption that intra-household resource distribution is equitable. At best the PRSPs adopt a 'women in development' approach (Zuckerman 2002a) , and this seems to be what the White Paper does in its analysis. The problem is that PRSPs fail to analyse the fundamental underlying power relations, and tend to reduce gender to a passing mention '. . . isolated freestanding paragraphs and sentences' (Zuckerman 2002a: 90) , with seldom any programs or approaches to eliminate gender inequalities. This is an important issue: impact studies looking at the effect of economic growth on gender inequality have found that while economic growth has improved the status of women as measured by the Gender Development Index (GDI, which is what would be expected under neoclassical and WID approaches), gender inequality as measured by the Gender Inequality Index (has been '. . . more impervious to change, and economic growth in some countries might result in rising, rather then declining, inequalities' (Forsythe et al. 2000: 608) .
3 India is one example in the AsiaÁ/ Pacific region in which rapid growth was followed by greater gender inequality, and although Papua New Guinea and Fiji had poor growth, they showed rising gender equality between 1970 and 1992 (Forsythe et al. 2000: 604) . Growth alone will not lead to greater gender equality. Policies and affirmative action programs are also
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AusAID and its approach to addressing poverty: a way forward
The Australian aid program has been grappling with chronic poverty in developing countries since the Jackson report, but generally it has taken the view that a growth path, rather than directly targeted programs, is the most effective way to deal with poverty (Jackson 1984) . Prior to the White Paper, the AusAID approach to poverty reduction rested on four pillars:
First, strengthening frameworks for sustainable and inclusive economic growth that will benefit the poor; secondly, supporting interventions that enable the poor to increase their productivity; thirdly, encouraging governments, institutions and donors to be more accountable to the poor; and, fourthly, reducing vulnerability through, for example, conflict resolution, disaster mitigation and emergency assistance (Downer 2001) .
Again, with the exception of dealing with emergencies, the White Paper does not seem to take on board the lessons learnt from DFID and the World Bank PRSP processes. It avoids mention of targeted programs to the poor or a rural focus through a targeted poverty reduction strategy, but instead focuses more on growth where it identifies governance issues and property rights 4 reducing conflict, and macroeconomic stability as key drivers in the aid program (AusAID 2006). The approach taken by the White Paper is very limited, and whilst there are some changes in focus, there has been little change in the actual poverty focus over the past two decades. However, the White Paper provides an opportunity for the government to flesh out the approach to poverty, and in this way there is flexibility within the framework to focus on different areas. As a way to more sharply address poverty, AusAID should focus on key themes that are based on the Millennium Development Goals, at the same time as recognising key criticisms of those goals. The framework should be based on:
. a sharper country poverty assessment that is based on analysis of the depth and spread of poverty, and the nature of social exclusion, in particular contexts; . an investment of resources in building the capabilities of the poor through more programs directly targeting the poor; . a rural infrastructure support program that recognises the important role that governments play in developing and maintaining rural infrastructure, which is essential for creating economic growth in agriculture, and to provide jobs and higher wages for the very poor, who are usually found in rural areas; and . an approach to aid delivery that focuses on downward accountability to the beneficiaries, in this case the poor, and having programs that are more inclusive and relevant.
The lesson gleaned from recent studies on the nature of poverty is that poverty is nuanced; it affects people in communities differently; and people on the margins are regularly falling in and out of poverty, something that the panel data tells us very little about. Current AusAID poverty analyses that are contained within country strategy papers, for example, provide an overview of where the poor are, but not much about who the poor are or why they are poor (for example, see AusAID 2004). All country programs should be able to demonstrate a greater focus on marginalised women and minority groups and how they are differently affected; and some analyses of the factors that restrict their capabilities, and block their broader participation. From this focus, ways would emerge to strengthen the capabilities of the poor and to reduce their vulnerability of falling into poverty.
The next question then, is, what should be implemented in a particular context? While it is important to work only on a few themes such as those outlined in the White Paper, it is also important to recognise that any approach that targets poverty should be relevant in a particular situation. So if it is recognised (which it usually will be) that women and minority groups such as indigenous people are the very poor (Mehta and Shah 2003) , then the approach used should be one that recognises that there are particular needs, whether it be in health, education, or governance (such as the poor's participation in local community processes). The overwhelming evidence is that the poor and most vulnerable are in rural areas, and that investment in rural infrastructure and production will directly affect the poor in these areas, reduce urban migration, and see a much quicker set of outcomes in terms of MDGs (Fan et al. 2005; Jha 2006; McCulloch and Calandrino 2003; Mehta and Shah 2003; Renwei and Shi 1997; Topalova 2005; Uphoff 2003) .
In terms of approaches to aid, it is important to recognise how procedures influence behaviours (Chambers and Pettit 2004) : at a practical level, greater participatory processes would be required so that the affected communities have a greater role in program design and activities; this is not only important for relevance reasons but in itself is an empowering process (Kilby 2006) . This would necessarily lead to a re-think of the planning tools used in aid projects, with more of a focus on '. . . principles, direction and process' and less on outputs and indicators (Chambers and Pettit 2004: 148) .
Conclusion
This article has outlined a few key issues that emerge from the White Paper and the direction the Australian aid program should take in its poverty approach. The key issue is the lack of nuanced analyses of poverty that recognises key elements including growing inequality, the ruralÁ/ urban divide, vulnerability, and the role of marginal groups. Since the release of the 2000 British White Paper on aid, DFID has developed a strategy that more directly targets the poor The Australian aid program: dealing with poverty? 125 and the reasons for their poverty rather than merely looking at the drivers and inhibitors of high growth rates. This article suggests a similar approach.
Dependence on high growth is not enough, and in some circumstances can be counterproductive. A more nuanced approach is required from AusAID that recognises that sharper targeting is required to reach the very poor, and the sectors in which they are found. From a practical point of view, this would mean a focus on rural areas that goes beyond the private sector suggested in the White Paper, but also involves the development of infrastructure to ensure markets and jobs can be expanded in these areas. Second, there should be recognition that there are marked differences in access to the capabilities of people to move out of poverty, and these may be related to gender, ethnicity and other social characteristics that lead to exclusion. Finally, a process of active involvement of the beneficiaries of the program in its development is critical for sustainability and the relevance of these programs.
Notes
1. The Poverty Gap Index is average the distance of the poor below the poverty line, as a proportion of the line. 2. The Gini coefficient can be interpreted as the expected income gap between two individuals randomly selected from the population on a scale of 0 to 1 with a low number indicating a small gap, and a large number indicating a large gap. 3. The GDI measures changes in life expectancy, education and access to income. The GI (Gender Inequality) measures the gap relative to the countries Human Development Index GI 0/(HDI-GDI)/HDI. That is, rather than measure absolute change, it measures the relative change in these three indicators of GDI relative to the rest of society, i.e. men. 4. It can be argued that the focus on property rights such as the Pacific Land Mobilisation
Program can lead to greater uncertainty and social instability, a key driver for increasing poverty. The privatisation of communally owned land generally has not been successful, and is arguably a high risk strategy in any approach to poverty alleviation.
